

Message Text

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AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 MOSCOW 19726

TEL AVIV FOR AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, CH, UR, XF, XJ
SUBJECT: CPSU RELATIONS WITH THIRD WORLD PARTIES: SOME POLICY
IMPLICATIONS

REF: (A) MOSCOW 16286 NOTAL, (B) MOSCOW 16669 NOTAL,
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(C) MOSCOW 13078 NOTAL, (D) MOSCOW 10967 NOTAL,
(E) MOSCOW 14089 NOTAL, (F) ADDIS ABABA MEMCON 9/9/76 NOTAL

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. THE SOVIETS HAVE MOVED RECENTLY TO
DEVELOP CLOSER, MORE FORMAL TIES BETWEEN THE CPSU AND
ANALOGOUS THIRD WORLD POLITICAL PARTIES (REF A, PARA 3),

DESPITE MOSCOW'S REALIZATION THAT THESE LATTER PARTIES ARE NOT TRULY "MARXIST-LENINIST." ALTHOUGH MOSCOW FACES MANY DIFFICULTIES IN TRANSLATING POLICY INTO ACTION, A SUCCESSFUL PROGRAM WOULD, FROM MOSCOW'S VIEWPOINT:

-- ENHANCE POLITICAL AND ESPECIALLY LEADERSHIP STABILITY IN TARGET COUNTRIES,

-- ENABLE THE INCREASED POLITICIZATION OF MOSCOW'S MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE THIRD WORLD,

-- ENCOURAGE A PRO-MOSCOW ALIGNMENT WITHIN THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT,

-- SHARPEN AN EXISTING POLITICAL TOOL FOR USE IN MOSCOW'S CONSTANT STRUGGLE WITH PEKING FOR INFLUENCE IN THE THIRD WORLD.

THE PURPOSE OF THIS ANALYSIS IS TO BRING A DISCERNIBLE TREND TO THE ATTENTION OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND ADDRESSEE POSTS, AND TO STIMULATE DISCUSSION OVER THE ISSUE AND MOTIVES OF THIS TREND IN SOVIET POLICY, AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY. END SUMMARY.

THE EMERGENCE OF A TREND.

2. THE AGREEMENT ON COOPERATION OF THE CPSU AND THE MPLA SIGNED BY BREZHNEV AND ANGOLAN PRESIDENT NETO DURING LATTER'S MOSCOW VISIT, AND PUBLISHED IN PRAVDA OCTOBER 14, COULD
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REPRESENT A WATERSHED IN THE RECENT TREND TOWARD MORE FORMAL PARTY-TO-PARTY TIES IN SOVIET AFRICAN POLICY.

3. THE REAL CHARACTER OF THE TREND IS NOT UNAMBIGUOUS, EVEN FOR THE SOVIETS, SINCE THE AVAILABLE EVIDENCE SUGGESTS THEY DO NOT CONSIDER THE AFRICAN PARTIES WITH WHOM THEY ARE DEVELOPING TIES TO BE "PARTIES" IN THE MARXIST-LENINIST SENSE REPRESENTED BY THE CPSU ITSELF. THE MPLA, ONE SOVIET SAID RECENTLY (REF B, PARA 3), IS A MASS "SOCIAL ORGANIZATION", RATHER THAN THE CENTRALLY CONTROLLED AND TRAINED POLITICAL CADRE A "PARTY" SHOULD BE. A ZNANIYE SOCIETY LECTURER TOLD HIS AUDIENCE NOVEMBER 15 THAT WHILE PARTIES IN SOMALIA, CONGO, ANGOLA, MOZAMBIQUE AND GUINEA-BISSAU WERE NOT YET MARXIST-LENINIST PARTIES, THEY HAD OPENLY DECLARED FOR THE "SOCIALIST PATH" AND WERE "STUDYING MARXISM-LENINISM". AN EXCHANGE OF PARTY WORKERS WILL INCREASE THEIR "SOCIALIST POTENTIAL", HE CONCLUDED.

4. THUS, THE SOVIETS RECOGNIZE THAT THEIR PARTNERS HAVE A WAY TO GO BEFORE THEY ARE FULLY EQUIPPED TO DEAL WITH THE CPSU ON THE SAME LEVEL. THE SOVIET-ANGOLAN PARTY AGREEMENT CONTAINS STRIKING REFERENCES TO COOPERATION IN TRAINING PARTY CADRE (ARTICLE 3) AND TO ANNUAL COORDINATION OF A MUTUAL PLAN TO IMPLEMENT AGREED-UPON MEASURES OF PARTY-TO-PARTY COOPERATION. THE SAME SPECIFIC TIME ELEMENT ON PARTY-TO-PARTY MEASURES APPEARS IN THE STATEMENT CONCLUDING MOZAMBIKAN PRESIDENT MACHEL'S VISIT TO THE USSR LAST SPRING (PRAVDA, MAY 24). THIS EMPHASIS ON AN ANNUAL PLAN NO DOUBT REFLECTS MOSCOW'S DESIRE TO GIVE A CUTTING EDGE TO THE VAGUE AND DESULTORY EFFORT OF RECENT YEARS TO DEVELOP PARTY TIES IN THE THIRD WORLD: MALI, SYRIA, IRAQ, ALGERIA, EGYPT. WITH TWO EXCEPTIONS (INDIA AND IRAQ), SOVIET TREATIES OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION WITH THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES HAVE INCLUDED ARTICLES ON COOPERATION AND DIRECT TIES BETWEEN THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS OF THE SIGNATORY COUNTRIES, BUT THE STATED GOAL OF THESE

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CONTACTS HAS BEEN SIMPLY TO DEVEOP DEEPER MUTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE "LIFE, WORK AND ACHIEVEMENTS" OF THE PEOPLES INVOLVED.

5. BY THE SAME TOKEN, STRESS ON ANNUAL PLANS SUGGESTS A NEW SOVIET SOVIET EMPHASIS WHICH GOES CONSIDERABLY BEYOND THE MODEST GOAL OUTLINED IN THE FREINDSHIP TREATIES. IN ADDITION TO THE CPSU-MPLA AGREEMENT AND TO THE MACHEL VISIT STATEMENT EMPHASIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF DEVELOPING CPSU-FRELIMO COOPERATION AND TIES ON A SYSTEMATIC BASIS, THE COMMUNIQUE CONCLUDING THE AUGUST VISIT OF SOMALI VP ALI SAMANTAR (IZVESTIYA, AUGUST 10) HIGHLIGHTED THE FORMATION OF THE NEW SOMALI REVOLUTIONARY SOCIALIST PARTY (SRSP) AND THE IMPORTANCE OF "CONTINUING AND STRENGTHENING TIES ON A PARTY LINE ON DIFFERENT LEVELS FOR AN EXCHANGE OF EXPERIENCE AND INFORMATION ON QUESTIONS OF INTEREST." OUR SOVIET INTERLOCUTORS HAVE BEEN SOMEWHAT VAGUE ON THE DETAILS OF SOVIET-SOMALI INTER-PARTY COOPERATION (REF C, PARA 2), BUT THE SOVIET MINISTER-COUNSELOR IN ADDIS ABABA WAS MORE CANDID ABOUT THE BENEFITS MOSCOW FORESAW (REF F), WHILE THE CHARACTER OF THE TREND MAY BE AMBIGUOUS, THEREFORE, ITS EXISTENCE DOES NOT SEEM OPEN TO DOUBT.

6. IT IS INTERESTING TO COMPARE CERTAIN IDEOLOGICAL ELEMENTS OF MOSCOW'S PRESENT POLICY WITH PREVIOUS SOVIET POLICY UNDER KHRUSHCHEV. AT THAT TIME, NATIONAL LIBERATION WAS TO BE FOLLOWED BY A DEFINITTE THREE STEP PROCESS--POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE, ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION OF SOCIETY, AND SOCIALISM. THE INTERMEDIATE STAGE WAS CLEARLY BOURGEOIS, CLEARLY DEVOTED TO "ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE, CONSOLIDATION OF SOVEREIGNTY, SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION, IMPROVEMENT OF

LIVING STANDARDS AND ADVANCEMENT OF CULTURE" (FROM THE
BOOK "A HISTORY OF AFRICA, 1918-1967", SIGNED TO PRESS 1968).
MOSCOW'S PRESENT POLICY SEEMS TO BLUR THIS FORMERLY
WELL-DEFINED STAGE, HOWEVER, BY SAING LITTLE ABOUT IT.
THE IMPLICATION IS THAT COUNTRIES IN THE THIRD WORLD
CAN MOVE TOWARD SOCIALISM IN A LESS DIALECTICAL MANNER.
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WE WOULD APPRECIATE INR COMMENT ON THIS POINT.

MOSCOW'S MOTIVATIONS

7. WE SEE A NUMBER OF FACTORS ENCOURAGING MOSCOW TO EMBARK
ON A DELIBERATE POLICY OF STRENGTHENING PARTY-TO-PARTY
RELATIONSHIPS WITH CERTAIN THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES, AND FEW
IF ANY SIGNIFICANT DISADVANTAGES FROM THE SOVIET POINT
OF VIEW.

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8. POLITICAL STABILITY AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE, BROADLY DEFINED, MAY HEAD THE LIST OF ATTAINABLE GOALS FOR THE SOVIETS. WE DEFER TO AFRICAN POSTS FOR SPECIFIC ASSESSMENT OF INTERNAL IMPACT OF SOVIET POLICY, BUT WE SEE FOLLOWING GENERAL LINES IN THIS REGARD. WE DO NOT EXAGGERATE THE POSSIBILITIES FOR SOVIET "CONTROL" OVER
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THE NEW PARTY PARTNERS, EVEN IN SOMALIA, SOVIET INFLUENCE HAS ITS LIMITS. LOGICALLY, HOWEVER, ANY INCREASE IN POLITICAL INFLUENCE RESULTING FROM SOVIET CADRE TRAINING OR THE PRESENCE OF CPSU PARTY WORKERS ATTACHED TO THESE DEVELOPING PARTIES WOULD BE BOTH DESIRABLE AND USEFUL TO MOSCOW. AT A MINIMUM, THE INTELLIGENCE POSSIBILITIES THUS OPENED UP WOULD BE VERY LARGE. AT A MAXIMUM, MOSCOW MIGHT IN THE FUTURE BE ABLE TO UTILIZE CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS IN KEY POSITIONS TO INFLUENCE EVENTS AND POLICIES DIRECTLY TO SOVIET ADVANTAGE.

9. IN BETWEEN IS THAT LARGE GRAY AREA WHERE PARTY-TO-PARTY TIES COULD HAVE THE POSITIVE EFFECT OF ENHANCING STABILITY AND THE NEGATIVE VIRTURE OF HEDGING AGAINST INSTABILITY WHICH WORKS AGAINST SOVIET INTERESTS. LESSENING THE RISK OF COUPS (LIKE GHANA'S IN 1966) OR SUDDEN SHIFTS IN POLICY (LIKE EGYPT'S IN 1972) FALLS IN THIS CATEGORY. SO DOES THE CHANCE TO EVALUATE AND CULTIVATE "FALL-BACK LEADERSHIP" IN ONE-PARTY OR ONE-MAN COUNTRIES, AND TO DEVELOP OPTIONS WHICH WOULD ENABLE MOSCOW TO PROTECT ITS ECONOMIC AND MILITARY INVESTMENT IN A GIVEN COUNTRY UPON THE DEATH OR REMOVAL OF CURRENT LEADERS.

10. A POSSIBLE SUBSET OF POTENTIAL ADVANTAGE IN THE AREA OF POLITICAL STABILITY OR POLITICAL INFLUENCE WOULD INCLUDE POLITICIZATION OF THE MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID RELATIONSHIPS.

11. THE DIRECT MILITARY AID RELATIONSHIP WHICH IS THE FOUNDATION OF SOVIET INFLUENCE IN MANY THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES HAS GENERALLY BEEN KEPT MORE OR LESS FREED OF DIRECT POLITICAL OVERTONES. PARTLY, THIS MAY BE DUE TO THE SOVIET MILITARY'S OWN STRESS ON PROFESSIONALISM; MAINLY, PERHAPS, IT REFLECTS

THE NATURAL PREFERENCE OF RECIPIENTS FOR AID WITHOUT
VISIBLE STRINGS ATTACHED. HOWEVER, THERE HAVE BEEN RECENT
SIGNS THAT MOSCOW MAY BE REEVALUATING THIS IMPORTANT
ASPECT OF ITS FOREIGN POLICY. THE SOVIETS WERE DEEPLY
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SHOCKED AT SADAT'S EXPULSION OF THEIR MILITARY ADVISERS
AND EXPERTS IN 1972, BUT THE BLOW MUST HAVE CARRIED THEM
BEYOND CONSIDERATIONS OF PRESTIGE AND SELF-ESTEEM TOWARD
RECOGNITION OF THE FACT THAT THEIR TREMENDOUS INVESTMENT
IN THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY HAD NOT PREVENTED THIS REVERSAL.
MEMO SCHOLAR GEORGIY MIRSKIY HAS WRITTEN IN HIS LATEST
BOOK "THE THIRD WORLD: SOCIETY, POWER, ARMY" (SIGNED TO
PRESS 1976) THAT "THE ARMY CANNOT BE THE POLITICAL VANGUARD
OF SOCIETY." AND SERGO MIKOYAN, THE KNOWLEDGEABLE EDITOR-
IN-CHIEF OF THE JOURNAL "LATIN AMERICA," TOLD EMBOFFS SOME
MONTHS AGO OF GROWING SOVIET DISILLUSIONMENT WITH THE
ABILITY OF THE MILITARY TO CARRY THROUGH "PROGRESSIVE"
PROGRAMS IN THE COUNTRIES THEY RULE (REF D. PARA 7).
SUCH THINKING COULD BOLSTER A TREND TOWARD POLITICIZING
MILITARY AID, AND PARTY-TO-PARTY RELATIONSHIPS WOULD
PROVIDE ONE DEVICE FOR DOING SO.

12. POLITICIZING ECONOMIC AID SHOULD ALSO PROMISE ADVANTAGES,
BUT THEY WOULD BE DIFFERENT. ENCOURAGING AND ASSISTING
"PROGRESSIVE SOCIO-ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATIONS" REMAINS A
CRITICALLY IMPORTANT IDEOLOGICAL UNDERPINNING FOR SOVIET
FOREIGN POLICY, AND ESPECIALLY FOR THIRD WORLD POLICY.
THE SOVIETS ARE NOT FOOLS, AND ARE WELL AWARE THAT THIRD
WORLD DEVOTION TO SOCIALIST TERMINOLOGY IS OFTEN LIP
SERVICE DESIGNED TO EXTRACT MORE SOVIET ASSISTANCE. BUT
THEY ARE SERIOUS ABOUT BOTH IDEOLOGY AND ECONOMICS, AND
IT IS IMPORTANT TO THEM TO BE ABLE TO POINT TO "PROGRESSIVE
TRANSFORMATIONS" IN THE COUNTRIES THEY HELP. AND, BY
"PROGRESSIVE", THEY HAVE IN MIND COMMITMENTS TO REORDER
THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM OF A GIVEN COUNTRY TOWARD STATE
OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL OF ECONOMIC FACILITIES, AT THE EXPENSE
OF PRIVATE AND EXTRA-NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL.

13. PARTY-TO-PARTY RELATIONSHIPS CAN HELP. THE
SOMALI AND ANGOLAN FRIENDSHIP TREATIES AND THE SOVIET-SAO
TOME COMMUNIQUE (PRAVDA OCTOBER 13) ON THE CONCLUSION OF
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PRIME MINISTER TROVOADA'S VISIT SPEAK OF SOVIET TRAINING
OF "NATIONAL CADRE" FOR THE ECONOMY, AND EVEN THE SOVIET-

ETHIOPIAN COMMUNIQUE (PRAVDA, JULY 14) ON THE CONCLUSION OF PMAC OFFICIAL MOGES WOLDE-MIKAEL'S VISIT STRESSED THIS ASPECT OF SOVIET ASSISTANCE. THE SOVIETS MIGHT NOW TRY TO INCREASE THE POLITICAL/JONTEICF TSP ECONOMIC CADRE TRAINING. IF THEY DID, IT WOULD ENHANCE MOSCOW'S ABILITY TO KEEP THE NATIONAL ECONOMIES OF THE RECIPIENT COUNTRIES ON THE "CORRECT" IDEOLOGICAL RAILS.

14. POLITICIZATION OF THE MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID PROGRAMS MIGHT ALSO SERVE TO SHORE UP THEIR POLICY VIABILITY INTERNALLY. WE DO NOT KNOW THE EXTENT OR EVEN THE NATURE OF SOVIET LEADERSHIP OPPOSITION OR CRITICISM OF FOREIGN AID. WE DO KNOW OF "MAN-IN-THE-STREETS" OPPOSITION SO WIDE-SPREAD AS TO BE ALMOST UNIVERSAL, AND SUSPECT IT FINDS AT LEAST SOME REFLECTION HIGHER UP THE POLITICAL LADDER. STRENGTHENING THE IDEOLOGICAL UNDERPINNING FOR THE AID PROGRAM SHOULD THEREFORE EASE WHATEVER PROBLEMS THE SOVIETS FACE IN SLICING UP A FINITE PIE OF ECONOMIC RESOURCES TO PROVIDE SLICES--NO MATTER HOW THIN--TO THE LDC'S. AN INCREASE IN THE CPSU'S INFLUENCE OVER UTILIZATION OF SOVIET ASSISTANCE IN THE FIELD WOULD GO SOME DISTANCE TO PLACATE LEADERSHIP DOUBTS, IF NOT TO TURN NEGATIVE PUBLIC SENTIMENT AROUND.

15. TWO RELATED (AND INTER-RELATED) FOREIGN POLICY FACTORS MAY ALSO ENTER THE PICTURE: NON-ALIGNMENT AND CHINA.

16. AS THEY BEGIN TO GRAPPLE SERIOUSLY WITH THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT'S EMERGENCE AS A "SERIOUS FACTOR" IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, THE SOVIETS SEE "SPLITTISM" AS ONE SERIOUS OPTION: THEY WILL BE INCLINED TO SEPARATE THE "SOCIALIST-INCLINED" SHEEP FROM THE OTHERWISE INCLINED GOATS AMONG THE NON-ALIGNED, AND TO PICK OFF THE FORMER AS CLIENTS. TO THE EXTENT THAT PARTY-TO-PARTY

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RELATIONSHIPS WITH REAL OR PROSPECTIVE SHEEP CAN CONSOLIDATE OR CREATE COMMITMENTS TO A "SOCIALIST PATH", OR "PROGRESSIVE SOCIO-ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATIONS," IT WILL MAKE THE SPLITTIST OPTION MORE ATTRACTIVE, AND SUCCESSFUL.

17. ON CHINA, THE SOVIETS MAY BE FEELING BULLISH FOR THE MOMENT, AFTER ANGOLA, ABOUT THE STATE OF THE COMPETITION IN AFRICA, BUT THE COMPETITION IS NEVER FAR FROM THEIR THOUGHTS, AND THE EFFORT TO INTENSIFY PARTY-TO-PARTY RELATIONSHIPS WITH KEY COUNTRIES IS NECESSARILY A "STRUGGLE INSTRUMENT" AGAINST THE CHINESE FOR THEM. A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES IN THE THIRD WORLD HAVE MILITARY AND ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS WITH BOTH THE USSR AND THE PRC. THIS SEEMS OFTEN TO PRESENT DIFFICULTIES FOR THE HOST COUNTRY. IT

WOULD SEEM THAT A SERIOUS PARTY-TO-PARTY RELATIONSHIP

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BETWEEN THE CPSU AND THE HOST COUNTRY PARTY WOULD VIRTUALLY
PRECLUDE A SIMILAR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CHINESE CP DUE
TO THE IDEOLOGICAL WRANGLES WHICH WOULD DEVELOP.

18. THESE TWO ELEMENTS ALSO CONVERGE: PARTY-TO-PARTY
TIES WHICH BOOST "SOVIET-STYLE" SOCIALISM IN THIRD WORLD
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COUNTRIES WOULD SERVE DEFEND THE USSR AGAINST CHINESE ATTEMPTS TO BLACKEN IT AS A DEVELOPED SUPERPOWER IN NON-ALIGNED FORA, EVEN WHILE THEY HELP SPLITIST TACTICS AMONG THE NON-ALIGNED THEMSELVES.

19. WE DO NOT EXAGGERATE THE PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET SUCCESS. MOSCOW CAN BE EXPECTED TO PROCEED VERY CAUTIOUSLY, ESPECIALLY IN THE MILITARY FIELD. GIVEN THE KEY IMPORTANCE OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN SOVIET RELATIONS WITH A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES, MOSCOW WILL NOTLIGHTLY JEOPARDIZE ITS POSITION BY PROCEEDING TOO QUICKLY WITH ANY ATTEMPT TO INFUSE PARTY IDEOLOGY AND TRAINING INTO ONGOING PROGRAMS. NOR WILL THE CHINESE SIT IDLY BY WHILE MOSCOW GAINS INFLUENCE BILATERALLY, REGIONALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY AT THEIR EXPENSE. THEY WILL SURELY MAKE THEIR VIEWS KNOWN TO THE COUNTRIES WHERE THE SOVIETS CONCENTRATE THEIR EFFORTS. CONVERSELY, MANY THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES THEMSELVES WILL RESIST SOVIET EFFORTS TOSPIN A CONNECTING WEB BETWEEN THE CPSU AND THEIR INDIGENUOUS POLITICAL PARTIES. SOME MAY REFUSE OUTRIGHT; OTHERS, FOR EXAMPLE MOZAMBIQUE, MAY TRY TO PLACATE MOSCOW BY AGREEING IN PRINCIPLE TO EXPAND AND DEEPEN TIES WHILE KEEPIN A STRICT PRACTICAL LIMIT ON WHAT ACTUALLY TRANSPIRES.

20. NEVERTHELESS THE SOVIETS BEGIN WITH CONSIDERABLE ADVANTAGES. THEY HAVE MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID TO GIVE; THEY HAVE BECOME MORE SOPHISTICATED OVER THE YEARS; "SOCIALISM" HAS A GOOD NAME IN THE THIRD WORLD; AND THERE ARE SUCCESSFUL EXAMPLES--OF "UUTUAL ADVANTAGE"--TO POINT TO. IT IS HARD TO OVERSETIMATE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SUCCESSFUL SOVIET MANEUVER IN USING THE CUBANS TO SAVE THE DAYS FOR THE MPLA IN ANGOLA. WHILE EXPENSIVE, CUBA ITSELF HAS GREAT INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL VALUE FOR THE SOVIETS, PARTICULARLY IN THE THIRD WORLD AND IN THE ROWLDWIDE SINO-SOVIET COMPETITION. NOW, IN COOPERATION WITH THE CUBANS, MOSCOW SEEMINGLY HAS THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXTEND ITS INITIALLY SUCCESSFUL CUBAN POLICY ON THE AFRICAN MAIN-CONFIDENTIAL

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LAND THROUGH THE REFASHIONING OF ANGOLAN SOEICEYT IN AN IMAGE CLOSER TO HTS HEART'S DESIRE.

U.S. POLICY OPTIONS

21. AT FIRST GLANCE, IT WOULD ALSO APPEAR THAT THE U.S. IS ILL-EQUIPPED TO COUNTER A SERIOUS SOVIET ATTEMPT TO CONSOLIDATE AND EXPAND ITS POLITICAL INFLUENCE IN CERTAIN TARGET COUNTRIES THROUGH PARTY-TO-PARTY TIES. THOSE PROGRAMS TRADITIONALLY OFFERED BY THE U.S. LACK THE LOCAL

CUTTING EDGE, IT SEEMS TO US, WHICH A SOVIET PROGRAM OF POLITICAL CADRE EXCHANGE AND TRAINING, AND ONGOING WORKING-LEVEL COOPERATION WOULD ENJOY.

22. NEVERTHELESS, IT MAY BE WORTHWHILE TO CONSIDER U.S. OPTIONS. THE PURPOSE OF THIS ANALYSIS HAS BEEN TO IDENTIFY A TREND IN SOVIET POLICY, RATHER THAN SUGGEST WHAT COUNTER-STRATEGY, IF ANY, IS DESIRABLE. AT THE SAME TIME, THE USG MIGHT, AT A MINIMUM, WANT TO BRING ITS ANALYSIS TO THE ATTENTION OF LEADERS IN THOSE COUNTRIES WHERE OUR MESSAGE WOULD HAVE SOME INFLUENCE. A LOGICAL CASE CAN BE MADE THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF TIES ALONG THE LINES ENVISIONED BY MOSCOW IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH GENUINE NON-ALIGNMENT AND WITH INDEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT.

23. WE WOULD APPRECIATE COMMENT AND DISCUSSION FROM ADDRESSEE POSTS AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ON THE TREND WE HAVE DESCRIBED.

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